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COMMENTS
THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY RELI-
GIOUS SCHOOLS-Bob Jones University v. United States -
Since Brown v. Board of Education,' racial discrimination in ed-
ucation has been considered contrary to public policy.2 In 1971,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), encouraged by the decision
in Green v. Connally,' which denied tax exempt status to ra-
cially discriminatory private schools in Mississippi, announced,
in Revenue Ruling 71-4474 that any private school seeking tax
exempt status must have.a "racially nondiscriminatory policy as
to students"' in order to qualify as a "charitable" organization
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Private schools are under a duty not to discriminate on the
basis of race, although for different legal reasons. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976); see also Fiedler v. Marcumsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980),
Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
2. Various methods have been used to achieve the elimination of racial discrimina-
tion in education, including section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1976) (prohibiting federal financial assistance to racially discriminatory institutions);
the prohibition of state tuition grants directed to students in alternative private schools,
e.g. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), Lee v.
Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem. sub nom.
Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967), Coffey v. State Educ. Finance Comm'n.
296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969) (three-judge court); and the prohibition of collateral
forms of state aid to segregated schools. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
3. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (three judge court), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971). Green v. Connally prohibited the IRS from issuing tax exemptions
and from allowing charitable deductions for contributions to racially discriminatory pri-
vate schools in Mississippi.
4. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
5. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
a) An organization described in subsection (c) . . . shall be exempt from taxa-
tion ... unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.
c) The following subsections are referred to in subsection (a):
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
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under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.6 Accord-
ing to the IRS, the federal policy against racial discrimination
warrants such a result.7
This IRS policy has been the subject of much controversy.
Questions have arisen regarding whether the IRS can consider
public policies not specifically mentioned in the Internal Reve-
nue Code in applying the exempt organization section of the
Code. The question whether the IRS can apply this policy to
schools which base their discriminatory policies on religious be-
liefs has also been raised. In Bob Jones University v. United
States,' the Supreme Court held that the IRS policy is a proper
exercise of the agency's authority and that the denial of tax ex-
empt status to Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian
Schools, educational institutions with racially discriminatory
policies based upon religious beliefs, does not unconstitutionally
interfere with the religious rights of the schools.9
In holding that an educational organization seeking tax ex-
empt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Code must serve a
public purpose in harmony with fundamental public policy, the
Court has added a powerful weapon for use in the war against
racial bias in education. Given the uncertain meaning of "funda-
mental public policy," there is, however, a possibility that the
rationale of Bob Jones could be used to deny exemptions to oth-
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inure to the bene-
fit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activi-
ties of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does
not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public
office.
6. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. A school has a "racially nondiscriminatory pol-
icy as to students" if it:
admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and activi-
ties generally accorded or made available to the students at that school and that
the school does not discriminate on the basis of race in administration of its
educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs, and
athletic and other school-related programs.
Id. The nondiscriminatory requirement was extended to church related schools by the
IRS in 1975. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158.
7. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971 C.B. 230.
8. Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
9. Id. at 2033-34.
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erwise qualified organizations that sincerely hold political views
that differ from those held by the government. This comment
will examine the history and policies that led to the Bob Jones
decision. It also will analyze the implications of the decision and
will briefly consider IRS efforts to enforce its policy of denying
tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools.
I. RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND IRS
POLICY
A. Pre-1969
Before 1965, the Internal Revenue Service, as one author
emphatically stated, "consciously, deliberately, and against con-
tinual opposition ''1° approved tax exemptions for private segre-
gated schools "thus sharing the costs of developing them." 1
From October, 1965 to August, 1967, the Service did not issue
any rulings on the large number of applications for exemption
submitted by newly formed private schools where racial discrim-
ination appeared to be a reason for the school's formation. 2 In
August, 1967, the IRS announced that it would no longer grant
exempt status to segregated schools whose "involvement with
the state . . . is such as to make the operation unconstitutional
or a violation of the laws of the United States.'
The IRS based this policy upon its interpretation of cases
such as Aaron v. Cooper 4 and Griffin v. State Board of Educa-
10. Spratt, Federal Tax Exemption for Private Segregated Schools: The Crumbling
Foundation, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1 (1970).
11. Id.
12. See Thrower, Statement Before the Ways and Means Committee on the Tax
Exempt Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools, 35 TAX LAW. 701 at 702
(1982), reprinted from Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax
Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearings Before the House Ways
and Means Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). (Randolph Thrower was the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue from 1969 to 1971.) See also Comment, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 179, 180 (1970).
13. IRS News Release, Aug. 2, 1967, reprinted at 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) V
6734 (1967) and Spratt, supra note 10, at 7.
14. 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). IRS officials read this case,
which involved the controversy surrounding the desegregation of the Little Rock, Arkan-
sas public school system, as rendering "illegal only direct payments by governmental
units to private schools organized to evade segregation." Spratt, supra note 10 at 7
(quoting from N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1967 at 24, col. 3).
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tion.'" The announcement was directed at those private schools
that received the benefits of state action in the form of tuition
grants or other financial assistance.' 6 This new policy did not
apply to discriminatory schools that were not recipients of state
aid, although the IRS promised to watch carefully for judicial
and legislative developments in the area.'7 The Service eventu-
ally conceded that "the 1967 policy was rather inconclusive and
in practical operation no adverse rulings were ever issued under
it.,,'8
B. Green v. Connally
In 1969, a group of Negro taxpayers with dependent chil-
dren attending public schools in Mississippi brought suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They
sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue from issuing tax exemptions to pri-
vate schools in Mississippi with racially discriminatory admis-
sions practices. They contended that sections 170'" and 50120 of
15. 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965) (state tuition grants to students attending pri-
vate schools unconstitutional since they predominantly maintained private segregated
schools); see also, e.g., Coffey v. State Educ. Finance Comm'n., 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.
Miss. 1969) (three-judge court), Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458
(M.D. Ala.), aff'd mer. sub nor. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
16. See, e.g., Pointdexter v. La. Financial Assistance Comm'n., 275 F. Supp. 833, 854
(E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968) ("any aid to segregated schools that is
the product of the State's affirmative purposeful policy of fostering segregated schools
and has the effect of encouraging discrimination is significant state involvement in pri-
vate discrimination."). See generally Note, Federal Tax Benefits to Segregated Private
Schools, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 922 (1968). For discussions of tax exemptions as governmen-
tal action see Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 927 (1975); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge
court); Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal
Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972).
17. See supra note 13.
18. Spratt, supra note 10 at 8.
19. 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1976), provides, in pertinent part:
For purposes of this section, the term "charitable contribution" means a contri-
bution or gift to or for the use of-
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation-
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or
under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or
any possession of the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, lit-
erary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
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the Internal Revenue Code were unconstitutional under the due
process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
extent that they supported the establishment and maintenance
of segregated private schools. A non-constitutional argument
was also raised. Plaintiffs contended that granting a segregated
school a tax exemption would violate the Civil Rights Act of
1964 which prohibits federal financial assistance to racially dis-
criminatory programs and activities.21 The court in Green v.
Kennedy22 found merit in plaintiffs' constitutional arguments
and issued an injunction pendente lite prohibiting the IRS from
issuing tax exemptions to schools in Mississippi unless the
school was found not to be a part of a system operated to allow
white parents to avoid sending their children to integrated pub-
lic schools.2 3
As a result of the injunction, the IRS announced that "it
could no longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status to pri-
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision
of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to chil-
dren or animals;
(C) no part of net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual; and
(D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by
reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate
in, or intervene in (including the publishing, or distributing of statements),
any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation shall
be deductible by reason of this paragraph only if it is to be used within the
United States or any of its possessions exclusively for purposes specified in sub-
paragraph (B).
20. See supra note 5. In addition to exempting qualified organizations from federal
income taxes, section 501(c)(3) also exempts organizations from social security taxes
(FICA), 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(8)(B) (1976) and federal unemployment taxes, 26 U.S.C. §
3306(c)(8) (1976). FICA exemption may be waived at the discretion of the organization.
26 U.S.C. § 3121(k)(1)(A) (1976).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefit of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."
22. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970) (three-judge court) (per
curiam order granting preliminary injunction), appeals dismissed sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971), Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
23. Id. In issuing the injunction, the court made clear that the "Federal government
is not constitutionally free to frustrate the only constitutionally permissible state policy
• ..by providing government support for endeavors to continue under private auspices
the kind of racially segregated dual school system that the state formerly supported."
309 F. Supp. at 1137. See also Comment, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 179, 186-190 (1970).
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vate schools which practice racial discrimination" and that do-
nations to these institutions would no longer qualify for tax de-
ductions as charitable contributions. 2'
The court granted final declaratory and injunctive relief in
Green v. Connally.25 Instead of basing its decision on the consti-
tutional grounds suggested in Green v. Kennedy, the court re-
lied upon an interpretation of the word "charitable" as it is used
in the Internal Revenue Code and upon principles of public pol-
icy."0 The holding in Green v. Connally was formally adopted by
the IRS, on a nationwide basis, in Revenue Ruling 71-447.27
C. Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools
1. Bob Jones University
Shortly after the IRS announced its new policy, it at-
tempted to revoke the tax exempt status of Bob Jones Univer-
sity of Greenville, South Carolina. Self-described as "the world's
most unusual university" 28 Bob Jones University was founded in
1927.29 In 1942, the IRS issued a ruling letter under the prede-
24. IRS News Release, July 10, 1970, reprinted at 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 6790 (1970).
25. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), aff'd mer. sub nor. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). Since the IRS effectively adopted the plaintiff's position, it
asked the court to moot the case. The court refused, noting that "a defendant does not
necessarily moot a case . . . by promising to conform to plaintiff's wishes." Id. at 1170.
Further relief was granted upon a motion by plaintiffs to enforce the decree in Green v.
Connally. Inter alia, the court made cleai" that its decree included church-related
schools. Green v. Miller, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9401 (D.D.C. 1980).
26. The Supreme Court based its decision in Bob Jones on the approach to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code described in Green v. Connally (This approach will be analyzed in
detail in connection with the discussion of Bob Jones.). Green held that in order for an
organization to be tax exempt under section 501(c)(3), it must be "charitable" in the
common law sense of the word. Under the law of charitable trusts, a charitable organiza-
tion must serve a public purpose that is not illegal or contrary to public policy. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 368 comment b, id. at § 377 comment c; G. BOGERT
& G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 201(5th ed. 1973). The court held that both statutes
and case law .have created a public policy against racial discrimination in education
which supports the denial of exempt status to discriminatory schools, 330 F. Supp at
1163-64.
27. 1971-2 C.B. 230.
28. Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 734(1974).
29. The purpose of the university is to conduct "an institution of learning for the
general education of youth in the essentials of culture and in the arts and sciences, giving
special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scrip-
tures .. " Bob Jones University v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D.S.C. 1978),
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cessor to section 501(c)(3) exempting it from taxation as an
educational organization. 1 Bob Jones is not affiliated with any
religious denomination. The school is devoted to education in
culture and the arts and sciences with special emphasis on its
founder's interpretation of Christianity.2 It is considered to be
"both a religious and educational institution."33
Prior to 1971, Bob Jones University would not admit black
students because it believed that the scriptures intended segre-
gation and prohibited interracial marriage.3 4 In 1971, it began to
admit as students married blacks and certain unmarried black
employees of the school.35
In 1975, Bob Jones began to admit unmarried blacks. 6 It
rev'd, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
30. I.R.C. § 101(6) (1939).
31. Record at A-13, Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
32. See supra note 29.
33. Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2022 (1983); see also Bob
Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 103 S. Ct.
2017 (1983) ("It is a religious institution in its own right, as well as an educational one.").
Compare the above with the text accompanying note 31, supra.
34. One court observed:
Among Bob Jones' deep religious convictions is the belief that the Bible forbids
the intermarriage of the races. . . .The policy is based on the belief that segre-
gation of the races is mandated by God, and that integration of the student body
would lead to interracial marriage, thereby violating God's command. This long-
standing policy, unlike the other basic precepts of Bob Jones is not set forth in
the University's corporate charter, bylaws, catalogues, or other publications.
Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 600 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514
(4th Cir. 1975) (denied veteran's benefits for failure to comply with Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
35. This policy only applied to unmarried blacks. Other minorities were admitted.
The rationale for this, according to Bob Jones III, university president, is that blacks,
unlike other minorities, agitate for interracial marriage, which he believes to be the fun-
damental thrust behind the desegregation movement. Id. at 600 n.9. See generally N.Y.
Times, Jan. 14, 1982, at A10, col. 1.
36. This decision was motivated by the holding in McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082
(4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976),
black students were denied admission to commercially operated non-sectarian private
schools on the grounds that the schools did not accept black children. Id. at 164. Plain-
tiffs contend that the refusal to admit black students violated the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), which guarantees "all persons within the United States
. ..the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens .. " The Court agreed, rejecting arguments that such a conclusion would violate
the principle of freedom of association, the parental right to choose the type of education
his child receives, and the right to privacy. Id. at 175-77.
A dissent by Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, argued that the legislative
history of § 1981 "confirms that the statute means what it says and no more, i.e., that it
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also instituted rules forbidding interracial dating and marriage.
Violation of these rules would result in the offender's expul-
sion. 7  These rules are presently in effect at Bob Jones
University.
When the university learned of the attempt to revoke its tax
exemption, it brought suit to enjoin the action. The Supreme
Court in Bob Jones University v. Simon," dismissed the suit on
procedural grounds. It held that the anti-injunction provision of
the Internal Revenue Code 9 barred the suit prior to an assess-
ment and payment of tax. The Court indicated a method by
which a taxpayer may make a partial payment of its tax liability
and sue for a refund on the ground that the tax was improperly
assessed.'0
The procedure suggested by the Supreme Court was used by
Bob Jones in 1978. In Bob Jones University v. United States,"
the district court rejected the IRS approach to section 501(c)(3),
as provided for in Revenue Ruling 71-447, and refused to uphold
the revocation of the school's tax exemption. The court found
that although Bob Jones "serves educational purposes,""' the
outlaws any legal rule disabling any person from making or enforcing a contract." Id. at
195 (White, J., dissenting). The importance of Runyon lies in its acknowledgement that
private schools are under a duty, albeit a non-constitutional duty, not to discriminate on
the basis of race.
37. That rule reads:
There is to be no interracial dating
1. Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will be expelled.
2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any group or organization
which holds as one of its goals or advocates interracial marriage will be expelled.
3. Students who date outside their own race will be expelled.
4. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage others to violate the Univer-
sity's dating rules and regulations will be expelled.
Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2023 (1983).
38. 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
39. 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (1976). See generally Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc.,
416 U.S. 752 (1974).
40. 416 U.S. at 746-47. Although the merits of the IRS policy were not addressed, the
Court did observe that its affirmance of Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.),
aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) "lacked the precedential weight
of a case involving a truly adversary controversy," 416 U.S. at 740 n.11, since the IRS
reversed its position while the case was on appeal. See supra note 24. The Court further
noted that Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, was not without "legal basis" nor
"unrelated to the protection of the revenues." 416 U.S. at 740 (dictum).
41. 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 103 S.
Ct. 2017 (1983).
42. Id. at 895.
COMMENTS
function for which its exemption had been granted, the "corner-
stone" of the school's activity was "Christian religious indoctri-
nation, not isolated academics."" 3 The court concluded that the
Service's policy requiring the revocation of tax exemptions of ra-
cially discriminatory schools would, if applied to Bob Jones Uni-
versity, violate the school's constitutional right to freely exercise
its religion and run afoul of the establishment clause of the first
amendment. Such an application, the court reasoned, would
favor those religions which conformed to federal policy." The
court found neither a compelling state interest which justified
any curtailment of rights protected by the religion clauses,4 5 nor
any "compelling public policy prohibiting racial discrimination
by religious organizations."' "4 The court further noted that noth-
ing in the legislative history of section 501(c)(3) supported the
IRS interpretation of it, and, in fact, the separate enumeration
of exempt purposes in the statute indicated that each activity
was separate and distinct.4 7
The Court of Appeals reversed. 48 It found that the "simplis-
tic reading" by the district court "tears section 501(c)(3) from
its roots"'4 e in charitable trust law. It also found that given the
compelling governmental interest in eradicating racial discrimi-
nation,50 the IRS policy did not interfere in a constitutionally
impermissible manner with the free exercise of religion. Bob
Jones would still be free to teach its beliefs as it saw fit. No
43. Id. at 894.
44. Id. at 899.
45. Id. at 898. The first amendment provides, in relevant part: "Congress shall make
no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST., amend. I. The impact of the religion clauses on the tax ex-
emption issue is discussed in the text accompanying notes 110-136, infra.
46. 468 F. Supp. at 899. The court stated that the discriminatory policy is based
upon "sincerely held religious beliefs." Id. at 903.
47. Id. at 901-02. The Court rejected the IRS interpretation of the term "charitable,"
as found in the IRS regulations, 26 C.F.R. § 501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(1983), along with the char-
itable trust roots of that section. One commentator remarked that the court, in effect,
"refused to try to balance whatever benefits may be generated by private segregated
schools against their adverse impact on society." Drake, Tax Status of Private Segre-
gated Schools: The New Revenue Procedure, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 463, 478 n.89
(1979).
48. 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
49. Id. at 151.
50. Id. at 152.
1983] 255
256 HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL [Vol. 1
student could be compelled to violate his or her beliefs.5 " The
court of appeals also found that the application of the IRS pol-
icy did not violate the establishment clause; "[t]he principle of
neutrality embodied in the Establishment Clause does not pre-
vent the government from enforcing its most fundamental con-
stitutional and societal values by means of a uniform policy,
neutrally applied."5 The Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari. 5
2. Goldsboro Christian Schools
Goldsboro Christian Schools, a non-profit corporation lo-
cated in Goldsboro, North Carolina, was founded in 1963 to pro-
vide a private education in a religious setting unavailable in the
public schools.5 Since its incorporation, it has refused to admit
51. Id. at 153-54.
52. Id. at 154. Judge Widener's dissent supported the district court's approach to the
statute and also argued that University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) permit race to be consid-
ered as a factor in some cases. 639 F.2d at 162-63 (Widener, J., dissenting). In Moose
Lodge, the Supreme Court held that racial discrimination by a fraternal order holding a
state liquor license was not sufficiently extensive state involvement with invidious dis-
crimination to constitute "state action." But cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity, 365 U.S. 715 (1969) (discriminatory private restaurant operating in a government-
owned building considered "state action"). Judge Widener found Moose Lodge to be sig-
nificant since it permitted a state privilege to be granted to a discriminatory private
group. This seems to be an exception to the general policy of denying government bene-
fits to discriminatory activities. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (text-
book loan program constitutionally impermissible as it tended to support a dual school
system); cf. McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court)
(fraternal order excluding nonwhites from membership not eligible for tax exemption);
Pitts v. Wisc. Dep't of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wisc. 1971) (enjoining state tax
exemption to clubs with racially discriminatory policies); 26 U.S.C. § 501(i)(Supp. IV
1980) (denies tax exemptions to certain racially discriminatory social clubs).
The dissenting opinion's reliance on Bakke is also inappropriate. Bakke held that a
person's racial or ethnic background may be used in a positive manner in determining
eligibility for admission to a medical school under certain circumstances. In applying
Bakke to Bob Jones University, the dissent would justify the use of race in a negative
fashion in order to support racially discriminatory policies. Such a result is not contem-
plated by the decision in Bakke, which envisions the use of race to remedy disadvantages
cast upon minorities by past discrimination. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980), United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See generally Saunders,
Bakke v. Regents of University of California: Potential Implications for Income Tax
Exemptions and Affirmative Action in Private Educational Organizations, 11 U.C.D. L.
REV. 1 (1978); Drake, supra note 47, at 500-01.
53. 454 U.S. 892 (1981).
54. Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (E.D.N.C.
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black applicants, justifying its policy on religious grounds.5
Goldsboro had never received a determination from the IRS that
it was entitled to a tax exemption. During an audit, the Service
determined that Goldsboro did not qualify for tax exempt status
under section 501(c)(3) and required it to pay unemployment
and social security taxes. 56 Goldsboro paid a portion of the
amount it owed and brought suit to obtain a refund. On a cross
motion for summary judgment, the court held that Goldsboro
was not entitled to tax exempt status. The court concluded that
"private schools maintaining racially discriminatory admissions
policies violate clearly defined federal policy and, therefore,
must be denied federal tax benefits flowing from section
501(c)(3)."57 The court based its decision primarily on Green v.
Connally. It also rejected Goldsboro's first amendment argu-
ments, finding a legitimate secular purpose that supported the
denial of the tax exemption.5 8 The Court of Appeals, finding "an
identity for present purposes"59 between the Goldsboro and Bob
Jones cases, affirmed in an unpublished opinion. 0 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari."1
1977), aff'd, 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Bob Jones University v. United
States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
55. 436 F. Supp. 1314, 1317. The Supreme Court described Goldsboro's beliefs thus:
[Riace is determined by descendance from one of Noah's three sons-Ham,
Shem and Japheth. Based on [Goldsboro's] interpretations, Orientals and Ne-
groes are Hamitic, Hebrews are Shemitic, and Caucasians are Japhethitic. Cul-
tural or biological mixing of the races is regarded as a violation of God's
command.
103 S. Ct. at 2024 n.6. Compare the district court's opinion:
That policy, based upon plaintiff's interpretation of the Bible, would seemingly
require the exclusion of all non-Caucasians. Nevertheless, plaintiff has on occa-
sion accepted non-Caucasians; hence, the racially discriminatory admissions pol-
icy in fact requires the exclusion of only applicants of the Negro race.
436 F. Supp. at 1317. Children of interracial couples have been admitted where one of
the parents was Caucasian. 103 S. Ct. at 2024.
56. 436 F. Supp. at 1317.
57. Id. at 1318.
58. Id. at 1320.
59. 103 S. Ct. at 2025.
60. See Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981).
61. 454 U.S. 892 (1981). Generally, once the Court grants certiorari, the party victori-
ous below prepares to defend the judgment below. Such was not the case here. Although
the government initially requested the Court to affirm the judgments of the Fourth Cir-
cuit, on January 8, 1982 the Justice Department notified the Court that the Treasury
Department planned to grant the contested exemptions to Bob Jones University, Golds-
boro Christian Schools, and all similarly situated schools. The Treasury would revoke all
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II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In an 8 to 1 decision,62 the Supreme Court affirmed the de-
cisions of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denying
tax exempt status to Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Chris-
tian Schools. The majority held that the IRS interpretation of
the exempt organization provision of the Code was proper con-
sidering the background of section 501(c)(3) and public policy.
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Service was empow-
ered to implement its policy and that denial of exempt status to
Bob Jones and Goldsboro would not be contrary to the com-
mands of the first amendment religion clauses.--
rulings and procedures in the area. The Justice Department also asked the Court to
vacate the lower court decision as moot.
This announcement drew vehement criticism from civil rights groups, lawyers, for-
mer IRS commissioners, attorneys in the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division,
among others. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1982, at D23, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1982, at
Al, col. 3. Bernard Wolfman, a noted tax scholar, described the action taken as "shock-
ing." Wolfman, Law, Cut on a Bias, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1982, at A27, col. 1, quote at
col. 3. Laurence Tribe thought the action to be "absurd," and "pathetic," and "a racist
double-standard." N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1982, at A12, col. 1.
A few days later, the President proposed legislation to deny the granting of such
exemptions in the future; however, until Congress acted, the new "policy" would be im-
plemented. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1982, at Al, col. 6. Several congressmen introduced bills
on the subject, none of which have ever left committee. See Administration's Change in
Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
On February 18, 1982, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
enjoined the government from granting tax exemptions to any private school that dis-
criminates on the basis of race. Wright v. Regan, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 82-757 (1982); see
656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Clearly the issue was not moot as the Justice Department
had suggested earlier.
The Justice Department announced it would argue that the law as it then stood did
not allow the IRS to deny exemptions to racially discriminatory schools that otherwise
qualify for tax-exempt status. It conceded, however, that Congress could legislate to
deny the exemptions, and that if the Court found that the law supported the IRS policy,
there would be no first amendment bar to the denial of exemptions to Bob Jones and
Goldsboro. It also suggested that the Court appoint someone to argue in defense of the
judgments below. The Court appointed William Coleman, a former Secretary of Trans-
portation, to defend the decisions of the Fourth Circuit. 102 S. Ct. 1964 (1982). See 103
S. Ct. 2017, 2025 n.9.
For an interesting look at a political motivation behind the Administration's change
in position see 15 TAx NOTES 304 (Feb. 8, 1982).
62. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority. Justice Powell
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
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A. Construction of Sections 170 and 501
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that certain organizations are eligible for tax exempt status in-
cluding "[c]orporations . . . organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable . . ., or educational purposes."' s If
"charitable" is read to reflect the popular conception of "char-
ity"-"the kindly and sympathetic disposition to aid the needy
or suffering; liberality to the poor . . . "64-a literal interpreta-
tion of the language of the Internal Revenue Code,65 indicates
that "educational" and "charitable" are separate and distinct
categories.6 An organization formed to operate a private school
63. See supra note 9.
64. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 378 (1971). Webster's defines
"charitable" as, inter alia, "practicing or showing charity: generous in assistance to the
poor." Id. See also Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, 581:
[O]f all the words in the English language bearing a popular as well as legal
signification I am not sure that there is one which more unmistakably has a
technical meaning in the strictest sense of the term, that is a meaning clear and
distinct, peculiar to the law as understood and administered in this country, and
not depending upon or coterminous with the popular or vulgar use of the word.
65. The general rule is that tax statutes should be interpreted, where possible, in
their ordinary everyday sense. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966) (per curiam).
This point was emphasized by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent from the denial of certio-
rari in Prince Edward School Foundation v. United States, 450 U.S. 944 (1981), which
involved the denial of tax exempt status to a foundation operating private schools in
Virginia. See Prince Edward School Foundation v. Commissioner, 478 F. Supp. 107
(D.D.C. 1979), aff'd per curiam, No. 79-1622 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 944 (1981). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist observed that "[G]iven the general rule
that the words of a statute, including the revenue acts, should be interpreted in their
ordinary everyday sense . . . the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to promul-
gate this policy . . . is sufficiently questionable to merit review. . . ." Id. at 894. Com-
pare the above with Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. [60 U.S.] 183, 194 (1857) quoted in
Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2025-26 (1983) (emphasis by the
Court):
The general words used in the clause. . . . taken by themselves, and literally
construed, without regard to the object in view, would seem to sanction the
claim of the plaintiff. But this mode of expounding a statute has never been
adopted by any enlightened tribunal-because it is evident that in many cases it
would defeat the object which the Legislature intended to accomplish. And it is
well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a
particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connec-
tion with it the whole statute . . and the objects and policy of the law. .. "
66. Such an approach, in effect, was followed by the district court in Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 901-02 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639 F.2d 147 (4th
Cir. 1980), afl'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (May 24, 1983). The district court opinion is discussed
in the text accompanying notes 41-47 supra.
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would not be considered "charitable" if the Code were construed
in this manner, yet it would be considered an "educational" or-
ganization eligible to accept contributions which the donor may
deduct from his taxable income subject to the provisions of sec-
tion 170. 6
The Supreme Court, relying in part on Green v. Connally,
held that sections 501(c)(3) and 170(c) of the Code indicate the
Congressional intent to base eligibility for tax exempt status on
common law standards of charity, "namely, that an institution
must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established
public policy." 68
The IRS has never specifically defined the term "charita-
ble" as it is used in the Internal Revenue Code. 9 The Service
has stated that the term is used "in its generally accepted legal
sense and is . . .not to be construed as limited by the separate
enumeration .. .of other tax-exempt purposes. . ." in section
501(c)(3).7 1 The "generally accepted legal sense" of "charitable,"
67. Similarly, "religious" and "educational" or "charitable" would be separate and
distinct classifications. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (1976).
68. 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2026 (1983). In reaching this conclusion, the Court tacitly ac-
knowledged that tax exemptions are a form of government benefit to an organization.
The day before it released its opinion in Bob Jones, the Court observed:
Both tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is adminis-
tered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a
cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its
income. Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a
portion of the individual's contributions.
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2000 (May 23, 1983).
In a footnote, Justice Rehnquist commented that "[i]n stating that exemptions and
deductions . . . are like cash subsidies . . . we of course do not mean to assert that they
are in all respects identical." Id. at 2000 n.5, citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
674-76 (1970). In Walz, which upheld the constitutionality of state and local property
tax exemptions for properties used for worship purposes, the Court observed that tax
exemptions "necessarily [operate] to afford an indirect economic benefit." Id. at 674.
In his concurrence in Walz, Justice Brennan observed that there was a qualitative
difference between an exemption and a subsidy. Id. at 690; see also id. at 699 (Harlan, J.
concurring); 125 CONG. REc. 3562 (1979) (statement of Rep. Dornan on bill providing
that the allowance of a charitable deduction shall not be construed as a federal subsidy.)
Only Justice Douglas thought that the subsidies were indistinguishable from exemptions.
Id. at 704 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The decisions in Regan v. Taxation With Represen-
tation and Bob Jones University v. United States seem to support Justice Douglas' view
of the tax exemption.
69. The term "charitable contribution," however, has been defined. See 26 U.S.C. §
170(c)(1976).
70. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)(1983). See generally Reiling, Federal Taxation:
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which includes the "advancement of education" as a charitable
purpose,71 is based on the law of charitable trusts.
Charitable trust law indicates that a charitable purpose is
one designed to be beneficial to the community.72 It has long
been held that a charitable gift is "to be applied consistently
with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of per-
sons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influ-
ence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from dis-
ease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish
themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings
or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of government. ' 73
The Supreme Court in Ould v. Washington Hospital for Found-
lings74 observed that "[a] charitable use, where neither law nor
public policy forbids, may be applied to almost anything that
tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man. '75
The Court in Bob Jones observed that these statements re-
vealed "the legal background against which. . the first charita-
ble exemption statute 76 was enacted in 1894./ This view was
reaffirmed in 1938 when Congress, in enacting a charitable de-
duction provision, observed:
The deduction is based upon the theory that the Govern-
What is a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A.J. 525 (1958); Bittker & Rahdert, The
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299
(1976).
71. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2)(1983). The IRS definition of "educational" is at id.
at § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3). But see Big Mama Rag v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (held IRS regulations defining educational organizations unconstitutionally
vague).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 comment b (1959) ("A purpose is
charitable if its accomplishment is of such social interest to the community as to justify
permitting the property to be devoted to the purpose in perpetuity."). See also G. Bo-
GERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 369 at 65 (2d ed. rev. 1977).
73. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 566 (1867). See also Wilson v. First
Nat. Bank of Independence, 164 Iowa 402, 145 N.W. 948 (1914).
74. 95 U.S. 303 (1878).
75. Id. at 311. See also Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] A.C. 531, 583; and supra
note 72. See generally Reiling, supra note 70.
76. 103 S. Ct. at 2027.
77. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556-57 (1894). The 1894 act was
declared unconstitutional for reasons unrelated to the exempt organization provisions.
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). A similar provision was
included in the Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909) and in all subse-
quent income tax acts. See generally Reiling, supra note 70.
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ment is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be
met by appropriations from other public funds, and by
the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general
welfare. 8
Upon this legal background, the Court concluded that an organi-
zation must provide a public benefit in order to be considered
charitable.
B. Racial Discrimination, Public Policy, and the Internal
Revenue Code
The public benefit requirement is only one element of the
common law definition of charity. It is also necessary that the
purpose of any charitable trust not be illegal or contrary to pub-
lic policy.7 9 "[I]t has now become an established principle of
American law, that courts of chancery will sustain and protect
a gift . ..to public charitable uses, provided the same is
consistent with local laws and public policy .. ."80 Essential to
this analysis of charitable trusts is the notion that the courts
must keep abreast of the changing conceptions of charitable pur-
poses held by members of the community, as indicated by
"moral and ethical precepts generally held"8' or in the change in
weight given to particular values and goals. As one commentator
observed: "What is charitable in one generation may be non-
charitable in a later age, and vice versa. Ideas regarding social
78. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. 19 (1938); see also Trinidad v. Sagrada
Order, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) ("Evidently the exemption is made in recognition of the
benefit which the public derives from corporate activities of the class named, and is in-
tended to aid them when not conducted for private gain."). See generally Bittker &
Rahdert, supra note 70; 4 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS
ch. 100 (1981); P. TREUSCH & SUGARMAN, TAX EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 3-8
(1979).
79.. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 377 (1959) ("A charitable trust cannot be
created for a purpose which is illegal."). See also id. at § 377 comment c (trust for a
purpose which is not illegal but is nonetheless contrary to public policy is invalid); Rev.
Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (organization formed to promote world peace by encourag-
ing civil disobedience not a charitable organization for tax purposes since trust law pro-
vides that no trust can be formed for an illegal purpose); and notes 73-75, supra.
80. 103 S. Ct. at 2027 (quoting Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 465, 501 (1861)
(emphasis added)).
81. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1159 (D.D.C.), aff'd mer. sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
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benefit and public good change from time to time and vary in
different communities."8
Traditionally, a racially restrictive trust provision was not
considered inconsistent with public policy:
[A] trust for education is none the less charitable al-
though the persons to receive the education are of a lim-
ited class, if the class is not so small that the purpose is
not of benefit to the community. Thus a trust for educa-
tion of children living in a certain district is charitable.
So is a trust to educate persons of a particular
race .... 83
There has been, however, "a change in knowledge, social con-
sciousness, and social conditions"" that reflects strongly against
racial discrimination. The court in Green v. Connally found that
"there is a declared Federal public policy against support for ra-
cial discrimination in education which overrides any assertion of
value in practicing private racial discrimination, whether
ascribed to philosophical pluralism or divine inspiration for ra-
cial segregation.""5 A similar conclusion was reached by the
82. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW O TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 369, at 66-67 (rev.
2d ed. 1977). See also 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 2855-56 (3d ed. 1967) ("The
interests of the community ...vary with time and place. Purposes which may be re-
garded as laudable at one time may be regarded as subserving no useful purpose or even
as being illegal. So too, what in one community is regarded as beneficial . . .may in
another be regarded as useless if not detrimental.").
83. 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 2879 (3d ed. 1967) (emphasis added). But see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 comment j (1959). Scott did not cite any au-
thority for his statement in 1967. In the 1981 supplement to the treatise, at page 66,
Lockwood v. Killiam, 172 Conn. 496, 375 A.2d 998 (1977) is cited as authority for the
proposition asserted in 1967. In that case, however, the court permitted the trustee to
avoid the racial restriction under the doctrine of cy pres. See generally 4 A. Scott, supra
at 3084-133.
84. Spratt, supra note 10 at 18. This can be illustrated by the judicial removal of
racially discriminatory educational trust provisions. See, e.g., Coffee v. William Marsh
Rice University, 408 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (university permitted to ignore
racially restrictive trust provision since benefactor's intent to create a first-class educa-
tional institution was made impracticable under the restriction). See also Green v. Con-
nally, 330 F. Supp. at 1160-61; Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 736 (1969).
85. 330 F. Supp. at 1163. The court in Green also concluded that policy considera-
tions may be taken into account in determining whether an organization qualifies for a
tax exemption. It cited as authority for this proposition Tank Truck Rentals v. Commis-
sioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). In Tank Truck, taxpayer attempted to deduct as an "ordinary
and necessary expense incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business," 26 U.S.C. §
162(a), fines paid for violations of state maximum weight laws. Thc Supreme Court disal-
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Court in Bob Jones: "[T]here can no longer be any doubt that
racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely ac-
cepted views of elementary justice."8
The policy against racial discrimination in the United
States can be traced to the enactment of the Civil War amend-
ments to the Constitution. The Thirteenth Amendment 7 pro-
vided for the abolition of all "badges and incidents of slavery." '
The Fourteenth Amendment 9 required the states to extend due
process and equal protection to all persons.90 The Fifteenth
Amendment 1 provided for universal male suffrage. These
amendments, along with other statements of policy, led the
court in Green v. Connally to conclude that racially discrimina-
tory private schools were engaged in acts which were "contrary
to a national policy that has constitutional ingredients."92
The Court in Bob Jones, citing judicial decisions,93 stat-
lowed the deduction, holding that a finding of necessity would not be made in regard to
the expenditure if "allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined national
or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by some governmen-
tal declaration thereof." Id. at 33-34. Deductibility depends upon the facts of each case
and turns upon the "severity and immediacy of the frustration" of policy if the deduc-
tion is allowed. Id. at 35. See also Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017,
2028 n.17 (1983); Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) (permitted deduction of
legal fees for criminal defense); Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958) (disallowed
deductions for expenses related to an illegal bookmaking operation); Mazzei v. Commis-
sioner, 61 T.C. 497 (1974) (denied deductions related to a counterfeiting scheme). See
generally Simon, The Tax Exempt Status of Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools,
36 TAx L. REV. 477, 496-500 (1981); Drake, supra note 47, at 468-69; Neuberger & Crum-
plar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack: Conflicting Goals of Religious Free-
dom and Racial Integration, 48 FORD. L. REV. 229, 241-44 (1979); Tyler, Disallowance of
Deductions on Public Policy Grounds, 20 TAx L. REv. 665 (1965).
86. 103 S. Ct. at 2029.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
88. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883); see generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
89. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV.
90. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1893); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873).
91. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV; see generally South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966).
92. 330 F. Supp. at 1166.
93. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) is the fundamental judicial
expression of the policy against racial discrimination in education. Brown, which prohib-
ited the maintenance of racially separate school systems, and its progeny stand for the
unassailable proposition that "[s]egregation in public education is not reasonably related
to any proper government objective . . . ." Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954);
see also Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
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utes,a4 and executive orders"5 that illustrate the national policy
prohibiting racial bias in education came to the conclusion that
racially discriminatory schools are not "institutions exercising
'beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life' ",96 whose
existence should not "be encouraged by having all taxpayers
share in their support by way of special tax status.' 97
19 (1958) ("The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds in school. . . is
so fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law.");
cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (discussed supra note 36); Fiedler v. Marum-
sco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980); Brown v. Dade Christian Schools,
Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (both
applying Runyon to racially discriminatory religious schools).
The policy against public support for racially discriminatory education, public or
private, is also represented by Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). There the
Court held that a Mississippi textbook distribution system, in operation long before ra-
cial discrimination in education became an issue, was an unconstitutional state support
for discriminatory education. The Court made clear that state support for private dis-
criminatory action is not tolerable under the Constitution. Id. at 463 (citing, inter alia,
Green v. Connally). The Court found the program to be a form of financial assistance to
the schools that was "not legally distinguishable" from tuition grants to students at pri-
vate schools. Id. at 463-64. It distinguished Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968), which upheld a similar program for religious schools, since the benefit there did
not promote religion but the loan here could be viewed as support for discriminatory
education. Id. at 468. In holding that a state benefit, other than a cash grant, to a private
discriminatory school is not permissible, Norwood lends considerable support to the pro-
position that a tax exemption to a discriminatory school is similarly impermissible under
the Constitution.
94. Statutes include Title IV and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000c, 2000c-6, 2000d (1976) and other civil rights and voting rights acts. See 103 S. Ct.
at 2030.
95. These include, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9980, 3 C.F.R. 720 (1943-1948 Comp.) (bar-
ring racial discrimination in federal employment); Exec. Order No. 10730, 3 C.F.R. 389
(1954-1958 Comp.) (authorizing use of the military to facilitate school desegregation);
Exec. Order No. 11063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963 Comp.) (denying federal assistance for
racially discriminatory housing). See 103 S. Ct. at 2030.
96. 103 S. Ct. at 2030 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
97. Id. at 2030. The Court also stated that "[i]t would be wholly incompatible with
the concepts underlying tax exemption to grant the benefit of tax exempt status to ra-
cially discriminatory educational entities, which 'exer[t] a pervasive influence on the en-
tire educational process.'" Id. (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973)).
It should be noted that the Court did not reach the argument advanced by the ami-
cus appointed to defend the decisions below that the fifth amendment bars issuance of
tax exemptions to racially discriminatory organizations. See 103 S. Ct. at 2032 n.24. See
generally the materials cited supra note 16.
HUMAN RIGHTS ANNUAL
C. IRS Authority to Implement Revenue Ruling 71-447
Both Bob Jones and Goldsboro contended that the IRS is
not authorized to require them to meet a qualification for tax
exemption-namely, that they operate on a racially nondiscrimi-
natory basis-that is not specifically enumerated in section
501(c)(3).1 By tracing the legislative grant of authority to the
IRS and Congrssional actions regarding IRS policy, the Court
concluded that the IRS acted properly in formulating Revenue
Ruling 71-447.
One of the most important functions of an administrative
agency is the adoption of procedures, rules, and regulations to
implement the statutory mandate of the agency. Congress has
granted the IRS the power to adopt appropriate rules and regu-
lations to implement the Internal Revenue Code.99 The IRS has
used this power in the past to deny charitable exemptions to
otherwise qualified organizations. For example, the Service re-
fused to grant exempt status to a recreational facility operated
in a racially discriminatory manner since it did not benefit the
entire community.100
The Court in Bob Jones concluded that the "IRS has the
responsibility, in the first instance, to determine whether a par-
ticular entity is 'charitable.' "101 It cautioned, however, that
"these sensitive determinations should be made only where
there is no doubt that the organization's activities' violate funda-
mental public policy. °10 2 All three branches of government have
concluded that racial discrimination in education is not in the
best interests of the public; the IRS could not be expected to
conclude differently.'0 8
The Court also concluded that Congressional action
"leave[s] no doubt that the IRS reached the correct conclusion
98. This view was also advocated by the Justice Department. See supra note 61.
99. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (1976) ("[T]he Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of this title . . ").
100. Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113. "Exclusion of a part of the entire community
on the basis of race, religion, nationality, belief, occupation, or other classification having
no relationship to the nature or size of the facility, would prevent the purpose from being
recognized as a sufficient public purpose to justify its being held charitable .... " Id. at
116.
101. 103 S. Ct. at 2032.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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in exercising its authority, ' 10 4 observing that the "non-action" of
Congress on this issue was "significant. ' 1 Since 1970, at least
thirteen bills have been introduced to overturn or modify IRS
policy regarding racially discriminatory schools;106 none has ever
left committee.10 7 Congress also favorably cited Green v. Con-
nally in the legislative history of a provision denying tax-exempt
status to discriminatory social clubs.108 This action, and the fail-
ure of Congress to do anything to disturb the legality of the IRS
policy, "provides added support for concluding that Congress ac-
quiesced in the IRS rulings. .",,9
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2033. Generally, non-action by Congress on an issue is not given much
weight by the Court. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680; 694 n.11 (1980) (failure of
Congress to overturn administrative interpretation falls short of providing a basis for
support of a statutory construction clearly at odds with its legislative history); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381-82 n.11 (1969) ("unsuccessful attempts at
legislation are not the best of guides to legislative intent").
106. The bills, which do not include the Ashbrook and Dornan amendments (dis-
cussed in note 109 infra), are listed at 103 S. Ct. at 2033 n.25.
107. 103 S. Ct. at 2033. Three sets of hearings were held on this issue. See Adminis-
tration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of Racially Discrimina-
tory Private Schools: Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982); Tax Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Equal
Educational Opportunity: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
108. 26 U.S.C. § 501(i) (Supp. IV 1980). The legislative history of section 501(i) cites
Green v. Connally and does not indicate congressional disapproval of its holding. H.R.
REP. No. 1353, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976); S. REP. No. 1318, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1976), reprinted in 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 6057, 6058 (1976). See also Mc-
Glotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) where a three-judge court held that
racially discriminatory fraternal organizations are not tax exempt but discriminatory so-
cial clubs are eligible for exemption. Section 501(i) reversed McGlotten with respect to
private social clubs. See generally Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Consti-
tutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972).
109. 103 S. Ct. at 2033. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1980) (congressional approval
of an administrative agency's policies may be inferred where there is no intent to repudi-
ate the administrative construction and where the policy is substantial and consistently
asserted by the executive branch); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S.
Ct. 683, 689 (1982) (in light of the well established judicial interpretation of the statute,
Congress' decision to leave it intact suggests that it ratified that interpretation); Loril-
lard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (Congress presumed to be aware of administrative
or judicial interpretation of a statute and adopts it when it reenacts a statute without
change).
Additionally, the Court rejected the contention that the Ashbrook and Dornan
amendments indicate congressional disapproval of the IRS' actions regarding the tax sta-
tus of private schools. The Ashbrook amendment provided that no funds appropriated to
the IRS be used to "formulate or carry out any rule, policy, procedure, guideline, regula-
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D. First Amendment Issues
Unlike Green v. Connally, Bob Jones involved schools
which justified their discriminatory practices on religious beliefs.
Petitioners argued that even if the IRS were authorized to adopt
its policy regarding racially discriminatory schools, application
of the policy to them would violate the free exercise clause of the
first amendment. 110
The free exercise clause is designed to prevent invasion of
the individual's religious liberty by civil authorities. The free ex-
ercise clause is violated when an enactment has a coercive effect
that operates against the practice of one's faith. In determining
whether there is an impact on free exercise, only a compelling
governmental interest will justify a burden on religious
liberty.'
tion, standard, or measure which would cause the loss of tax exempt status to private,
religious, or church operated schools . . . unless in effect before August 22, 1978." Trea-
sury, Postal, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, §
103, 93 Stat. 562 (1979). Its purpose was to prevent the enforcement of proposed revenue
procedures designed to bolster efforts at enforcing Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 C.B.
230. See 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978); 44 Fed. Reg. 9451, corrected at id. 11,021 (1979).
The amendment, however, does not affect Revenue Procedure 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587, the
current IRS procedure for enforcement of Revenue Ruling 71-447. See Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2034 n.27 (1983); 125 CONG. REc. 18446 (1979)
(statement of Rep. Ashbrook). The Dornan amendment, Pub L. No. 96-74, §§ 614-15, 96
Stat. 576 (1979) prevented the IRS from enforcing Revenue Ruling 79-99, 1979-1 C.B.
108, which restated the general principle that taxpayers are not entitled to a deduction
under section 170(c) for payments to a private tax exempt religious school unless the
contributions exceed the fair market value of the education provided to taxpayer's child.
See Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972) (stating the rule adopted in
Rev. Rul. 79-99); 125 CONG. REc. 18,808-09 (1979) (Rep. Dornan's introduction of the
amendment).
The Court found that these amendments were only concerned with "limiting more
aggressive enforcement procedures ...and preventing the adoption of more stringent
substantial standards," 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2034 n.27 (1983), and do not affect the validity of
the underlying IRS policy. See also Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency En-
forcement: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1374, 1380-86 (1980); cf. Wright v.
Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983) (Ashbrook
and Dornan amendments bar IRS action but do not restrict the judiciary).
H.R. 533, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), introduced by Rep. Crane, would prevent the
Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate from implementing any new procedure or regu-
lation similar to the 1978 proposed procedure, supra. No action has been taken on this
bill.
110. See supra note 45.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 835 (1978).
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It has been held that the governmental interest in the fam-
ily and marriage justifies the prohibition of polygamy even when
one's religion encourages the practice. 112 Furthermore, the
state's interest in enforcing its child labor laws" 3 and in setting
aside "one day. . . as a day of rest, repose, recreation, and tran-
quility" 1"4 were found to outweigh the individual free exercise
concerns asserted.
United States v. Lee'15 is a recent example of this approach
in the tax area. In Lee, a member of the Old Order Amish did
not pay the social security taxes required of employers on the
ground that members of his faith routinely provided for the
needs of its elderly and infirm." 6 After rejecting a statutory
claim, 17 the Court found that granting exempt status to the
Amish would be inappropriate because of the "broad public in-
terest in maintaining a sound tax system,""' which outweighs
the religious interest of the Amish in caring for their own or not
paying the tax." 9
This line of cases was dispositive of the free exercise issue in
Bob Jones."'0 The government interest in eradicating racial dis-
112. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878). But see Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note 85 at 266-68 (criticizing
IRS and judicial reliance on these cases to justify denial of exemptions to racially dis-
criminatory religious schools).
113. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
114. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961) (Sunday closing law does not constitute an establishment of religion).
115. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
116. Id. at 255. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
117. 455 U.S. at 256. See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1976) (allows self-employed individuals
to obtain exemptions from taxation on religious grounds).
118. 455 U.S. 252, 260. In addition to noting that "religious belief in conflict with the
payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the tax," id., Chief Justice Burger also
observed that "mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social
security system." Id. at 258.
119. In concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens keenly observed that a "tax ex-
emption entails no cost to the claimant; if tax exemptions were dispensed on religious
grounds, every citizen would have an economic motivation to join the favored sects." Id.
at 264 n.3.
120. In light of the Bob Jones decision, Judge Levanthal's dicta in Green v. Connally
is both ironic and dispositive:
We are not now called upon to consider the hypothetical inquiry whether tax-
exemption or tax-deduction status may be available to a religious school that
practices acts of racial restriction because of the requirements of the religion.
Such a problem may never arise; and if it ever does arise, it will have to be
considered in light of the particular facts and issue presented, and in light of the
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crimination in education"2 ' is compelling and petitioner's inter-
ests could not be accomodated with it.' 22
Denial of tax exempt status will have a considerable effect
on the affected schools. A loss of exempt status, and the corre-
sponding ability to receive tax deductible contributions, may re-
sult in a decrease in the number of donations received by the
institution. It is probable, however, that ardent supporters of the
school's religious practices (or of racially discriminatory educa-
tion) would continue to contribute regardless of the availability
of an income tax deduction. Additionally, most religious schools
can raise funds through tuitions and fees. Tuition has never
been considered a deductible charitable contribution since there
is a lack of donative intent.12 3
Futhermore, the denial of exempt status does not stop ei-
ther of the schools from practicing its religious beliefs. Both
schools still may screen and admit students on the basis of reli-
gious belief, and both may continue to teach according to their
religious beliefs. All the Bob Jones decision seeks is the end of
all government support of private discrimination in education; 2 '
established rule. . . that the law may prohibit an individual from taking certain
actions even though his religion commands or prescribes them.
330 F. Supp. 1150, 1169 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 85-95. The Court made clear that the issue
in this case involved religious schools, not churches or institutions whose sole purpose is
religious. 103 S. Ct. at 2035 n.29 (1983).
A church which refuses to extend membership to members of its faith of a different
race would presently qualify for a tax exemption. Whether the rationale of Bob Jones
can be applied to a purely religious function is uncertain, given the constraints of the
establishment clause; however, a racially discriminatory church that operates a school
where both secular and non-secular subjects are taught must administer the school in
accordance with a racially nondiscriminatory policy. Cf. Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B.
158 (denial of tax exemption to church-run discriminatory school does not affect the
exempt status of the church itself).
122. 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2035 (1983). The Court also concluded that "no less restrictive
means" were available to achieve the governmental interest. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Re-
view Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).
123. Channing v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1933), aff'd per curiam, 67
F.2d 986 (1st Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 686 (1934); see also Oppewal v. Commis-
sioner, 468 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1972); Rev. Rul. 79-99, 1979-1 C.B. 108 (discussed supra
note 109); Rev. Rul. 71-112, 1971-1 C.B. 93; see generally Commissioner v. Duberstein,
363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960) (for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 170(c), a gift "proceeds from a
'detached and disinterested generosity' . . . . [T]here must be an objective inquiry as to
whether what is called a gift amounts to it in reality.") (citations omitted).
124. As one commentator observed in his discussion of the district court opinion in
Bob Jones:
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it does not compel private entities to behave in a particular
manner.
The Supreme Court also rejected Bob Jones' contention
that the IRS policy contravened the establishment clause 25 by
favoring religions that do not require racial discrimination or
segregation as part of their practices. 26
The goal of the establishment clause is government neutral-
ity toward religion, where government does nothing toward ad-
vancing religion nor anything that requires one to conform to a
particular religious belief. 2 7 Recent decisions of the Supreme
Court have applied a three part test to determine whether a law
is an unacceptable establishment of religion. To be valid, the law
must reflect a secular purpose, have a principle or primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and must not foster
an excessive entanglement with religion. 2 s
Application of this test to the question of tax exemptions
for racially discriminatory religious schools reveals that the IRS
policy does not violate the establishment clause so long as it is
enforced in a fair and equitable manner. The IRS rule is
designed in relation to a secular purpose. It is "establishe[d] be-
yond doubt . . . that racial discrimination in education violates
a most fundamental national public policy" 2 9 and that its eradi-
cation is a compelling purpose.
The second part of the test, which provides that the enact-
ment must not have a primary effect that advances or inhibits
A reversal would not threaten religious freedom . . . because few individual
members of minority groups will seek to participate in religions the tenets of
which include belief in racial segregation. Very few public policies are as impera-
tive as the need to desegregate society; frequent encroachment on religious free-
dom on other public policy grounds is most unlikely.
Drake, supra note 47, at 502; see also Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597
(D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
125. See supra note 45.
126. 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2033 n.30 (1983).
127. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); see also Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (most immediate purpose of the establishment clause rests on
the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and
degrade religion); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 818 (1978) (establishment
clause can be "understood as designed in part to assure that the advancement of a
church would come only from the voluntary support of its followers .
128. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
129. 103 S. Ct. at 2029.
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religion, is also met.'30 The IRS is not interested in the nature of
a school's religious beliefs or practices nor does it require a
school to conform to a particular belief. The sole concern of the
IRS is whether the school is deliberately discriminating against
racial groups while receiving a tax benefit underwritten by tax-
payers. All the IRS seeks to do is to eliminate a form of govern-
mental financial support for racial discrimination; it does not
seek to reward or punish religious schools for their practices. It
should also be noted that the IRS policy applies to religious
schools-institutions that serve both a religious and secular pur-
pose-and not to churches themselves. As one commentator
observed:
[T]o the extent that a discriminatory religious school
serves a secular function .. .to grant exempt status to
such a school while denying the same status to secular
discriminatory schools tends to favor the discriminatory
religion over secular schools. [Such] an exemption as-
sist[s] conduct (racial discrimination in secular educa-
tion) which is not protected by the freedom of religion
clause (because secular in nature) while forbidding a sec-
ular school from engaging in the same conduct. . . .At
least as much as denying an exemption to the secular
functions of a discriminatory school, granting an exemp-
tion to the secular functions tends to violate the proscrip-
tions of the establishment clause, which precludes the
favoring of religious schools over secular schools.'
Moreover, as the Court in Bob Jones indicated, "a regula-
tion does not violate the Establishment Clause merely because it
'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
130. With regard to this test, the IRS position has been criticized as favoring reli-
gions with well established educational programs, as opposed to smaller groups with non-
traditional beliefs. See Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note 85 at 262. These criticisms
have arisen, in particular, regarding a proposed revenue procedure, 44 Fed. Reg. 9451,
corrected id. at 11,021 (1979) (discussed infra notes 171-174). See also Drake, supra note
47; Simon, supra note 85.
131. Simon, supra note 85, at 513-14 (footnotes omitted). See also Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (indicating that religious schools may not be favored over
secular schools); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1168-69 (D.D.C.) (three-judge
court), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (distinguishing the school
exemption issue from the church exemption issue). Contra Laycock, Tax Exemptions for
Racially Discriminatory Schools, 60 TEx. L. REv. 259 (1982).
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religions.' ,,Is'
Finally, the IRS policy does not create an excessive entan-
glement with religion. It does not require that a school show that
its policies are inspired by a sincere religious belief.' 3 All that
must be determined is "whether the school maintains racially
neutral policies."'' Although taxation, by its very nature, in-
volves some degree of governmental involvement, the applica-
tion of the tax laws against a racially discriminatory school is
not a hazard prohibited by the establishment clause. Although
these schools are subject to taxation, nothing forces them to
hold or teach beliefs inconsistent with their faith. Additionally,
the national policy against public support for racially discrimi-
natory education warrants such a result."3s Since the IRS stan-
dards are designed to be uniformly applied to all schools where
the problem may arise, there will only be a "[minimal] intrusion
into the operations of the school"' 3' while important human
rights interests are met.
III. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. Concurrence
The opinion of Justice Powell, concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment,' 3 ' raises interesting and important
questions regarding the scope of the majority opinion. Justice
Powell's opinion is based on the premise that if it were not for
"a decade of acceptance that is persuasive in the circumstances
of this case""'  he would agree with Justice Rehnquist'39 that
sections 170(c) and 501(c)(3) establish the only statutory criteria
132. 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2035 n.30 (1983) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
442 (1961)).
133. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Even if the school's policy is
based on a sincere religious belief, it is not entitled to tax exempt status.
134. Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 155 (4th Cir. 1980), afld,
103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
135. Id. at 155 n.10; see also Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).
Some income of religious organizations is already taxed. See Simon, supra note 85 at
506-09.
136. 639 F.2d 147, 155; see also Drake, supra note 47; Simon, supra note 85; contra
Laycock, supra note 131; Comment, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 949.
137. 103 S. Ct. at 2036.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2039 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
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for tax exempt status and that the IRS cannot consider, under
those provisions, the racial policies of the exempt
organization. "'
Justice Powell differs with the Court's holding that an ex-
empt organization must provide "a clear public benefit as de-
fined by the Court"'' to qualify for benefits under section
501(c)(3). Noting the diversity of organizations that are exempt
from taxation,4 Justice Powell doubts that "all or even most of
those organizations could prove that they 'demonstrably serve
and [are] in harmony with the public interest' or that they are
'beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life.' 9143
The concurring opinion also raises a more serious concern.
Justice Powell fears that the majority's holding that exempt or-
ganizations "demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the
public interest" 4 requires that tax exempt organizations "act
on behalf of the government in carrying out governmentally ap-
proved policies. '" 5
The majority opinion requires that exempt organizations
pursue a public purpose that is not illegal or contrary to "funda-
mental public policy." Other than race discrimination in educa-
tion, the Court does not indicate what constitutes a fundamental
public policy. This can result in considerable problems. Suppose
that a non-profit organization engaged in the dissemination of
balanced information on issues related to world peace and global
security seeks tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3). To ob-
tain the exemption, the organization not only must show that it
is an educational organization," it also must show that it is or-
ganized for a public purpose not contrary to fundamental public
policy. Suppose further that this group, after a thorough study
of all points of view, concludes that world peace would best be
140. Justice Powell places considerable emphasis on the enactment of section 501(i)
in his decision to concur in the judgment. Id. at 2037 n.2.
141. Id. at 2037.
142. Id. at 2038 n.3. These organizations include such diverse groups as the National
Right to Life Educational Foundation and Planned Parenthood.
143. Id. at 2038.
144. Id.
145. Id. Compare Justice Powell's opinion here with the text accompanying note 78,
supra.
146. See the lequirements in section 501(c)(3) and the accompanying regulations, 26
C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(1983).
[Vol. 1
COMMENTS
achieved if the United States discontinued all forms of military
aid to Central American nations. Assume that an American mili-
tary presence in some limited form is the current policy of the
United States.
Clearly the dissemination of information on international
peace would be a public purpose; " 7 however, a broad or careless
reading of the term "fundamental public policy" as used in the
Bob Jones decision could result in a denial of an exemption to
our hypothetical organization since the group disagrees with the
government on a particular policy the government deems to be
important. As Justice Powell states: "such a view of [section]
501(c)(3) ignores the important role played by tax exemptions in
encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities
and viewpoints."' 48 Additionally, "the provision of tax exemp-
tions to nonprofit groups is one indispensable means of limiting
the influence of government orthodoxy on important areas of
community life.""'9 Given the value that is placed on free ex-
pression in the United States, tax exempt status should not be
denied to any organization solely because its beliefs differ from
those of political decisionmakers. The first amendment's protec-
tion of free speech, the right to associate, and the freedom of the
press outweighs any governmental interest in denying exempt
status to groups that contribute to public debate and the overall
body of knowledge. 50 In order to avoid any possibility of misuse,
147. "The fact that an organization, in carrying out its primary purpose, advocates
social or civic changes or presents opinion on controversial issues with the intention of
molding public opinion or creating public sentiment to an acceptance of its views does
not preclude such organization from qualifying under section 501(c)(3) so long as it is not
an 'action' organization" described in 26 C.F.R. § 501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(1983). Id. at §
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 370 comment g (1959)
(trust for dissemination of beliefs is charitable even if the beliefs are not in accordance
with prevailing public opinion). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 370 comment h
(1959) (trust for dissemination of irrational, yet legal beliefs, is not charitable); Rev. Rul.
75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (organization formed to promote world peace whose primary
purpose is to sponsor protests where civil disobedience is encouraged not considered
charitable for tax purposes or under trust law).
148. 103 S. Ct. at 2038; see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970)
(Brennan, J. concurring).
149. 103 S. Ct. at 2038.
150. As one noted commentator stated, "[s]uppression of belief, opinion, and expres-
sion is an affront to the dignity of'man, a negation of man's essential nature." T. EMER-
SON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966). Cf. Speiser v. Ran-
dall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (state law requiring loyalty oath to obtain tax exemption is
1983]
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the Bob Jones rationale presently should be restricted to cases
of racial discrimination, as it was suggested in oral argument
before the Court. 5' Any expansion of Bob Jones to cover other
areas, such as sex discrimination or discrimination on the basis
of alienage or handicap, should be carefully weighed by Congress
to prevent any undue burden on permissible, beneficial, or other
protected activities that may adversely affect (or fail to benefit)
some minority. 5 As one commentator observed in a related
violative of due process).
The fear that the public policy rationale developed in Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) affd. mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) would
be used to deny exempt status to organizations exercising constitutional rights or other-
wise engaging in lawful activity that the state does not approve of has been raised by
some commentators. See Comment, 50 TEx. L. REV. 544 (1972); Neuberger & Crumplar,
supra note 85 at 243 n.101.
151. At oral argument, Justice Powell asked William Coleman, the amicus curiae ap-
pointed by the Court to support the decisions below, whether the same rules applied to
sex discrimination. Coleman responded that "(w]e didn't fight a Civil War over sex dis-
crimination and pass an amendment to the Constitution against it." He also noted that
the policy against racial discrimination is "crystal clear." (That observation was made in
response to a question regarding the scope of the Court's opinion.) See 51 U.S.L.W. 3295
Oct. 19, 1982) (summary of oral argument); N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1982 at A19, col. 1
(report on oral argument).
Whether an organization that discriminates on the basis of sex should be eligible for
a tax exemption is a question that should eventually be faced in light of the interpreta-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code approved by the Court in Bob Jones. Presently, such
organizations have been found to be eligible for tax exemptions. See McCoy v. Schultz,
73-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) V 9233 (D.D.C. 1973); IRS Technical Advice Memorandum
No. 7744007, reprinted in IRS LETTER RULING REPORTS (CCH), Nov. 4, 1977. See also
Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974); cf. In re Estate of Wilson, 59 N.Y. 2d 461, 452 N.E.
2d 1228, 465 N.Y.S. 2d 900 (1983) (rejected challenge to scholarship programs benefitting
males only). For a criticism of the Technical Advice Memorandum see Ginsberg, Sex
Discrimination and the IRS: Public Policy and the Charitable Deduction, 10 TAX
NOTES 27 (Jan. 14, 1980).
152. Justice Powell believes that the Court implied that the IRS can determine what
policies are so fundamental that they require organizations acting contrary to them to
lose their tax exempt status. 103 S. Ct. at 2038. According to Justice Powell, the primary
function of the IRS is to collect revenue. Id. at 2039; see also Commissioner v. "Ameri-
cans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1974) (Blackmun, J. dissenting). According to
the majority, Justice Powell misreads its opinion. 103 S. Ct. at 2039 n.5 (Powell, J. con-
curring). An agency, however, does not exist in a vacuum; it must be aware of the overall
social environment in order to be effective. This is especially true of the IRS: "The Code
has an effect on every important financial decision one makes. . . . Contentions that the
Service's concern should only be with purely fiscal matters are unsound because the fed-
eral system of taxation is today a social institution as well as a fiscal one." Drake supra
note 47, at 507. Given the role the policy against racial discriminaton in education plays
in our society, the IRS cannot be expected to ignore expressions of policy developed in
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context: "The coercive use of tax policy is acceptable if its ulti-
mate aim is the elimination of racial segregation. . . .A tax pro-
vision whose administration is so ill regulated that it permits the
coercive weapon to be used against an organization because it is
'doctrinaire' may not be justified ... ."
B. Dissent
Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist" acknowledges that although
Congress could authorize the IRS to deny tax exempt status to
racially discriminatory schools, it has not yet done so. According
to him, the Court's conclusion that public policy may be consid-
ered in determining whether an organization is eligible for a tax
exemption is not required by section 501(c)(3) nor can it be in-
ferred from the charitable deduction provision in section
170(c).' 5 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist does not agree that
the legislative history of the exempt organization provisions war-
rant the conclusions reached by the majority. The history re-
flects, according to Justice Rehnquist, congressional intent to
grant tax exemptions to corporations, community chests, funds,
and foundations organized for one or more of the enumerated
purposes in section 501(c)(3) and does not require that an or-
ganization first qualify as a "charitable organization.' 5 6 Criticiz-
other parts of government which have a broad societal impact. However, given the strict
scrutiny which has been extended to disadvantaging racial classifications, see Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and the
lesser level of scrutiny extended to other classifications, see, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976) (sex), it is not likely that the IRS could, on its own initiative, extend the Bob
Jones rationale to areas other than race without some form of congressional approval
despite the desirability of such action. Cf. Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S.
Ct. at 2033 (tracing the implied congressional approval of Revenue Ruling 71-447).
153. Note, Tax Exemptions for Educational Institutions: Discretion and Discrimi-
nation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 849, 875 (1980); see Big Mama Rag v. United States, 631 F.2d
1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (declared IRS regulations defining educational organizations un-
constitutionally vague since they could be used to restrict freedom of expression).
154. 103 S. Ct. at 2039.
155. Id. Justice Rehnquist's views on this issue are foreshadowed in his dissent from
the denial of certiorari in Prince Edward School Foundation v. United States, 450 U.S.
944 (1981), discussed supra note 65.
156. 103 S. Ct. at 2040. It should be noted that the IRS has long construed the Inter-
nal Revenue Code as requiring that an exempt organization be charitable in the common
law sense of the term. See Sol. Op. 159, Il-1 C.B. 480 (1924); see also Rev. Rul. 67-325,
1967-2 C.B. 113 (holding racially discriminatory recreation facility unqualified for tax
exempt status since it did not provide the public benefit required under trust law).
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ing the IRS decision to change its interpretation of section
501(c)(3), he described the new approach to the statute, adopted
during litigation the Service believed it would lose,1 57 as one "en-
titled to very little deference. ' 1
Justice Rehnquist also challenged the majority's finding
that Congress had approved the IRS policy. According to him,
the bills that were introduced and the hearings that were held in
Congress only represent "a vigorous debate 1 5 9 over a controver-
sial policy and does not support an inference of congressional
approval by its failure to repeal or modify the policy.
Justice Rehnquist is correct in concluding that congres-
sional inactivity generally should not be considered congres-
sional approval of regulatory action. The IRS approach involved
in Bob Jones, however, has been hotly debated for at least
twelve years and has been approved by every appellate court
that has confronted the issue."1 0 Additionally, the circumstances
under which the Service adopted the policy presently embodied
in Revenue Ruling 71-447 deserve some deference. The decision
of a federal court (Green v. Connally) is a strong reason for an
agency to change its policy. Major changes in tax policy should
be made by Congress, but where Congress has not indicated its
disapproval of a longstanding administrative policy, especially in
an area related to achieving the elimination of public support for
157. See Thrower, supra note 12, at 706.
158. 103 S. Ct. at 2039.
159. Id. at 2043. Justice Powell suggests that Congress codify the IRS policy. Id. at
2039. Codification of holdings in tax cases is not unusual. See 26 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1976)
which codifies the holding of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) that stock divi-
dends are not taxable income under the Sixteenth Amendment.
Justice Rehnquist also disagrees with the Court's treatment of the Ashbrook and
Dornan amendments, (discussed at note 109, supra) id. at 2044; however, he agrees that
the IRS could deny exemptions to racially discriminatory schools if this action were
properly authorized. He also agrees that a policy against racial discrimination exists and
that application of the policy would not infringe on petitioner's first or fifth amendment
rights. Id. at 2044-45 nn.3-4.
160. Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 103 S.
Ct. 2017 (1983); Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, 644 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.
1981), aff'd sub noma. Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983);
Prince Edward School Foundation v. Commissioner, 487 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1979),
aff'd per curiam, No. 79-1622 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 944 (1981). Cf.
Wright v. Regan, 656 F. 2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983);
Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927
(1974); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (three-judge court).
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racial discrimination, the IRS action should be deferred to by
the Congress and the courts.
IV. ENFORCEMENT
A. IRS Procedures
Since the IRS announced in 1970 that it would no longer
permit racially discriminatory private schools to be eligible for
tax exempt status, it has had difficulties in enforcing its policy.
The earliest enforcement effort, Revenue Procedure 72-54,1"
was widely criticized as ineffective.16 2
Revenue Procedure 75-50," s attempted to provide stricter
standards. It required schools to include a statement of their ra-
cially nondiscriminatory policies in the school's charter, gov-
erning instrument, or in a resolution adopted by the school's di-
rectors. Schools must include similar statements in all their
publications dealing with admissions policy, programs, and
scholarships. The methods a school can use to publicize their
policy are limited by the procedure to newspaper advertisements
of a certain size and format and to the broadcast media.'"
The 1975 procedure included factors considered by the IRS
in determining whether a school qualifies for a tax exemption. It
recognizes that the absence of minorities in the student body
does not necessarily mean that an institution is discriminatory
161. Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834. A "meaningful number" of minority students
enrolled was considered evidence of a school's nondiscriminatory policy. A school unable
to make this showing was required to take affirmative steps to indicate that it would
operate on a racially nondiscriminatory basis. It must have shown that a nondiscrimina-
tory policy had been adopted and had been publicized to all racial segments in the com-
munity served by the school. This requirement could be met by a notice in a newspaper
of general circulation serving all racial groups in the area. The notice had to appear in a
prominent position and be captioned to call attention to it, although it could appear in
the body of an article rather than in a separate advertisement. The school could also use
the broadcast media, its own publications, or communications to "leaders of racial mi-
norities" to meet the publicity requirement. Id. This procedure did not apply to Missis-
sippi schools to the extent that it was inconsistent with the more stringent requirements
of Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1179-80.
162. 3 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS EN-
FORCEMENT EFFORT-1974 at 363-66 (1975). See also Drake, supra note 47 at 482, n.114;
Note, Racially Discriminatory Schools and the IRS, 33 TAx LAw. 571 (1979).
163. 1975-2 C.B. 587.
164. See id. at 588 for the text of an announcement that meets IRS requirements.
Additionally, certain church related schools are permitted to communicate their policy
through the publications of the sponsoring religious body. Id.
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since there could be few minorities in the community served by
the school."' Actual enrollment, nonetheless, is a persuasive fac-
tor, especially in areas where public schools are subject to either
a court or an agency order to desegregate. 1 6" Private schools are
also required to maintain records regarding the implementation
of their non-discrimination policies. 167 Revenue Procedure 75-50
is still in effect today.
Revenue Procedure 75-50 has not solved the problems it
was implemented to address." In order to facilitate enforce-
ment of its policy, the IRS, in 1978, proposed a new proce-
dure. a"9 Public outcry, especially from religious schools with low
minority enrollments that feared the loss of their exemptions,7
resulted in a new proposal in 1979.171
The 1979 proposal created two classes of schools that are
suspected not to have racially nondiscriminatory policies. A
"school adjudicated to be discriminatory" is one which a final
judgment of a federal or state court, or an appropriate federal
agency, finds, after conducting an adversary proceeding, to be
discriminatory.1 72 A "reviewable school" is one that was formed
or substantially expanded at the time of public school desegrega-
tion in a community that does not have significant minority en-
rollment and creation or expansion of which was related to pub-
lic school desegregation. 17  In order for an adjudicated or
reviewable school to qualify for a tax exemption, it must show
that it has adopted nondiscriminatory policies.17 ' Legislative
amendments introduced by Representatives Ashbrook and
165. Id. at 589.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 590.
168. "In addition, the Service was under pressure to take stronger measures. Not only
did the plaintiffs in Green [v. Connally] reopen the case in 1976 . . but another claim
also was filed, asserting that the Service's nationwide enforcement effort was unsatisfac-
tory. These actions were strong incentives for the Service to promulgate its own proce-
dure, and thus avoid the issuance of an administratively burdensome injunction. Drake,
supra note 47 at 486 (footnote omitted).
169. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978).
170. See Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note 85, at 232. See also Drake, supra note
47, at 463 n.4.
171. 44 Fed. Reg. 9451, corrected, id. at 11,021 (1979).
172. Id. at 9452.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 9454. See Drake, supra note 47, and Neuberger & Crumplar, supra note
85, for detailed analyses of the 1979 proposal.
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Dornan, however, have prevented the IRS from officially adopt-
ing the 1979 procedure. 175
It is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest a detailed
enforcement procedure. Since there is no longer any doubt that
the IRS can deny exemptions to discriminatory schools, the Ser-
vice should develop an adequate method of discovering and de-
nying benefits to non-complying schools.17 6 A school which a
court has found to be discriminatory should be denied exemp-
tions (or have their exemptions revoked) as soon as that judg-
ment is final. Schools that are suspected of being discriminatory
should be given a full opportunity to prove that they are not
engaging in acts contrary to public policy. Any procedure
adopted should not unduly burden the schools or the adminis-
trative process and should not offend the sensibilities of the
Congress or the courts.1 77 Without proper enforcement, the
Court's antidiscriminatory mandate in Bob Jones will have no
meaning.
B. Third Party Enforcement
The IRS initiated proceedings to deny tax exempt status to
Goldsboro Christian Schools and to revoke the exemption of
Bob Jones University. In contrast, Green v. Connally involved a
challenge against the IRS by a group of taxpayers. In the deci-
sion granting preliminary relief to those plaintiffs, Green v. Ken-
nedy, the court held that plaintiffs had standing to bring the
action.178
Whether third parties have standing to sue the IRS in order
to force the agency to enforce its policy of denying tax exemp-
tions to racially discriminatory schools was recently addressed in
175. See supra note 109; see also 127 CONG. REC. H395 (daily ed. July 30, 1981).
176. The United States Commission on Civil Rights estimated, in 1978, that at least
3500 segregated schools with tax exemptions exist in the United States. See Cohen, Ex-
empt Status For Segregated Schools: Does The Constitution Permit Lower Standards
For Tax Benefits Than For Direct Grants, 17 TAx NOTES 259, 263 (Oct. 25, 1982).
177. Effort should be made to avoid any situation that might result in another bill
such as the Ashbrook amendment. See Parnell, supra note 109; see generally Cohen, Let
I.R.S. Now End Jonesism, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1983, at A27, col. 1. (suggesting how
IRS should enforce its policy); N.Y. Times, June 14, 1983, at B16, col. 1.
178. 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (D.D.C. 1970), appeals dismissed sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971); Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970). See also Note, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 922, 954-58 (1968).
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Wright v. Regan.'79 Parents of black children attending public
schools in eight states sought to obtain relief similar to that ob-
tained by the plaintiffs in Green v. Connally.'8" The district
court dismissed the complaint.' 8 ' It held that plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue and that the suit was barred by the doctrine of
nonreviewability.' 8 It also concluded that any relief would be
contrary to the will of Congress as expressed in the Ashbrook
and Dornan amendments. 83
The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs had standing to
sue. It rejected the lower court's reliance on the doctrine of
nonreviewability. 184 It also found that the Ashbrook and Dornan
amendments were not intended to bar judicial activity on the
tax exemption issue. 185
In reaching its decision, the court said it would "select from
two divergent lines"' 86 of relevant precedents the one that best
fit the issue before it. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization'87 represents one strand of decisions. The
Supreme Court held that persons seeking to challenge a revenue
ruling changing the requirements to be met by hospitals seeking
to be tax exempt lack standing. 88 The Court concluded that the
injury alleged-the denial of service at a hospital-could not be
said to flow from the tax exempt status of the hospital.' 8 '
179. 656 F.2d 820 (D.C.Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
180. This case was brought shortly after the plaintiffs in Green reopened their case in
order to enforce the original decree and to obtain further relief. The requested relief was
granted as modified by the court. Green v. Miller, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9401
(D.D.C. 1980).
181. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd sub noma. Wright v. Re-
gan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
182. 480 F. Supp. at 797.
183. See supra note 109.
184. 656 F.2d at 835-37.
185. The intent of the amendments was to prevent the IRS from implementing ad-
ministrative policies. See id. at 832-35.
186. Id. at 828.
187. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
188. Plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky, various groups and individuals, alleged that the
changed policy encouraged hospitals to deny services to the individual plaintiffs and to
the members and clients of the group plaintiffs. The injuries alleged were denials of ser-
vices to individual plaintiffs. Id. at 33.
189. "It is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint
fairly can be traced to petitioners' 'encouragement' or instead result from decisions made
by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications." Id. at 42-43. Cf. Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing since they failed to show a
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The competing strand of decisions considered by the
Wright court includes Norwood v. Harrison,9 0 Gilmore v. Mont-
gomery,'9' and the 1980 decision permitting the plaintiffs in
Green v. Connally to obtain further relief against the Internal
Revenue Service.1 92 These cases are similar in that third parties
were allowed to challenge governmental action inconsistent with
the policy against racial discrimination. These cases also resem-
ble Wright since none of the plaintiffs sought to obtain relief
against the private entities receiving the challenged governmen-
tal benefits.
The court found the latter line of cases to be dispositive.
Those cases "presented plaintiffs whose standing seems . . in-
distinguishable on any principled ground"' 93 from those in
Wright. Given the role the policy against racial discrimination
has in "our contemporary . . . constitutional order,"' 94 the court
chose not to follow Eastern Kentucky.""
Wright v. Regan represents a unique approach to a compli-
cated and confused area of law. Recent cases on standing have
tended to limit the situations in which third parties are permit-
ted to challenge governmental action.'96 Permitting third parties
to bring suits to require the IRS to enforce its antidis-
criminatory policy would encourage the agency to vigorously en-
force the policy to avoid excessive judicial interference in agency
connection between the zoning practices challenged and their alleged injury). See gener-
ally Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4,
16-26 (1982).
190. 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (discussed at note 92 supra).
191. 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (barred exclusive temporary use of public recreation facili-
ties by segregated private schools).
192. Green v. Miller, 80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9401 (D.D.C. 1980).
193. 656 F.2d at 831.
194. Id. at 832.
195. Id. Judge Tamm criticized the court's reliance on this line of cases over Eastern
Kentucky. Id. at 838-48 (Tamm, J. dissenting).
196. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (refused to extend standing to organization chal-
lenging governmental action authorized by the Property Clause, Art. IV § 3, of the Con-
stitution); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1972). But see United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669 (1973) (extending standing to a public interest organization alleging that its
members have suffered noneconomic injury); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (ex-
tending standing to taxpayers challenging taxing and spending programs that may con-
travene the free exercise or establishment clauses). See generally Chayes, supra note
189, at 8-26.
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operations. The Supreme Court will decide whether these suits
shoud be permitted. 97
CONCLUSION
Bob Jones University v. United States adds a powerful
weapon to the fight against racial bias in private education. One
result of the decision may be that some schools will abandon
racially discriminatory policies in order to retain their tax ex-
emptions. Although this result may benefit society, it is not
mandated by the Bob Jones decision. All that the Court holds is
that the IRS may require a private school to show that it is ra-
cially nondiscriminatory in order to qualify for a tax exemption.
This policy furthers the governmental interest in eliminating
public support for racially discriminatory education. The Su-
preme Court has done nothing to prevent the continued exis-
tence of segregated private schools or to infringe upon the rights
of parents to send their children to discriminatory schools." 8
The decision also does not bar the teaching of miscegenetic ideas
by any school, regardless of whether it qualifies for tax exempt
status.
The loss of tax exempt status should not threaten the con-
tinued existence of non-complying schools. 9' Many schools will
probably suffer from a decline in contributions since those con-
tributions will no longer qualify as tax deductions. These lost
funds may be raised from other sources such as tuition charges
and other user fees. Any liability for federal income tax should
not be unbearably large. These schools generally do not have
large net incomes and the full panoply of tax benefits and de-
ductions generally available to taxpayers will be available to
197. Certiorari was granted on Wright v. Regan June 20, 1983. 103 S. Ct. 3109 (1983).
198. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923). Note that Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), discussed supra
note 36, has had a substantial affect on the admissions practices of private schools.
199. The loss of tax exemption should not be viewed as a form of punishment for
engaging in racial discrimination. Tax exemptions are not automatically granted; an or-
ganization must show that it is entitled to it by meeting the qualifications enumerated
by the statute and regulations. The failure of an organization to meet the requirements
for the benefit, or to remain in compliance with the statutory and administrative criteria
for the exemption, mandates that the IRS revoke or deny the preferential status. Viewed
in this light, the denial of a tax exemption cannot be considered a punitive action.
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The Bob Jones decision can also be viewed as a product of a
system that has failed. The period since Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation has been characterized by many attempts to evade its
nondiscriminatory mandate. Both reasoned and impassioned ar-
guments against racial bias in education have gone unheeded in
many areas. The IRS policy approved in Bob Jones represents
an effort to eliminate public support of discriminatory education
by denying offending schools tax benefits that are ultimately
financed by the public.20 1 It is unfortunate that such methods
are perceived to be needed to obtain basic human dignity for a
significant portion of the population.
Nonetheless, the public policy approach approved of in Bob
Jones should be of considerable value in the effort to eliminate
all vestiges of public support of racial discrimination, provided
that it is properly enforced.0 2 Considerable care should be taken
to ensure that the policy approach to section 501(c)(3) is not
used to deny tax exemptions to organizations that merely disa-
gree with a political policy or goal of government. This power
should be used to deny exemptions only to those groups which
engage in illegal activities or activities that are contrary to poli-
cies fundamental to the overall dignity of humankind. The Su-
preme Court has given the IRS, and Congress, a tool which can
be used to discourage certain evils in our society. It should not
be abused.
Paul N. Gruber
200. The Court did not rule on the question of whether all tax benefits are to be
denied to racially discriminatory schools. Cf. Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356
U.S. 30 (1958) (only denied deduction of traffic fines on public policy grounds). Addition-
ally, the liability for social security and unemployment taxes that are to be borne by
private discriminatory schools should not be overly burdensome.
201. See the discussion of Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997
(1983), in note 68 supra.
202. Allowing individuals to bring suit against the IRS to enforce Revenue Ruling 71-
447, as permitted in Wright v. Regan, may be useful in encouraging compliance by the
affected institutions and adequate enforcement by the Internal Revenue Service.
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